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Abstract 
I present a business case for democracy, focusing on the impact of democracy on economic 
growth. This relationship is widely studied, and results are less clear for growth than many other 
development outcomes such as literacy or infant mortality. I discuss four factors pertaining to 
data quality and modelling choices, suggesting that several previous studies have underestimated 
the growth-benefits of democracy. I also discuss the relationship between democracy and 
economic crises and variation in economic performance. By mitigating abysmal economic 
outcomes and ensuring more stable performance, democracy is generally of benefit to risk-averse 




What would you pick if you had to choose between freedom and bread? Most people – I suspect 
– would choose bread. Several social scientists (and authoritarian leaders) have suggested that a 
similar trade-off, at the macro-level, pertains to the choice between autocracy and democracy. 
Democracy may ensure more extensive political rights and better protection of liberties for 
citizens, but autocracy presumably enables development-minded leaders to push through 
different policies and reforms that enhance economic growth.  
A stylized version of this argument goes as follows: Development-minded autocrats can 
initiate large-scale infrastructure projects with fewer constraints from partisan wrangling and 
opposing interest groups. They can also take a longer time horizon than their myopic citizens 
and channel resources toward public and private savings rather than consumption, thereby 
achieving higher investment rates than what is viable in democracies. Political rights and civil 
liberties are, supposedly, luxury goods to be afforded sometime in the distant future once 
economic development has been achieved. Democracy and freedom may have intrinsic 
normative value, but – the argument goes – ensuring economic development is more important. 
Advocates of this argument often point to the development experiences of a handful of 
autocracies, with the extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy after its economic reforms in 
the late 1970s and 80s being a prime example.  
Nevertheless, the trade-off between democracy and development is far from evident. 
Whether democracy helps or hinders economic development relative to more authoritarian 
regimes is, ultimately, an empirical question. As Amartya Sen noted more than twenty years ago: 
It is sometimes claimed that the denial of [political and civil] rights helps to stimulate 
economic growth and is ‘‘good’’ for economic development. Some have even 
championed harsher political systems – with denial of basic civil and political rights – for 
their alleged advantage in promoting economic development. This thesis … is sometimes 
backed by some fairly rudimentary empirical evidence.1 
This assessment highlights the importance of systematic empirical evaluation, rather than simply 
postulating a relationship that can be used to justify the denial of rights to citizens under 
autocratic rule. Indeed, numerous scholars have responded to the call, producing hundreds of 
empirical studies. While empirical results were mixed in many of the earlier studies, the 
conclusions reached by most recent studies with careful research designs -- especially from the 
last 15 years -- is that democracy either has no clear effect, or that it tends to enhance GDP per 
                                                            
1 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15. 
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capita (p.c.) growth, on average.2 Recent work shows that democracy does not even harm growth 
in poor countries where strong state institutions are missing, a context where many scholars have 
long believed that democracy is “premature” and unfit for generating development.3 
Despite this strong evidence to the contrary, the idea that autocracy is better for 
economic development persists among policy makers and some academics. One likely reason is 
the stellar economic performances of certain, high-profile autocratic regimes. In the 1930s, 
Stalin’s 5-year plans and Hitler’s building of the German Autobahn received widespread 
admiration. Aided by regime propaganda and inflated statistics, these experiences were perceived 
as impressive economic accomplishments pushed through by “strong leaders”. After WWII, the 
rapid growth of export manufacturing in authoritarian South Korea and Taiwan, fueled by high 
savings rates and creative industrial policies, were widely regarded as authoritarian success 
stories. More recently, the industrialization and fast growth of the Chinese economy has 
captivated policy makers and academics alike, spurring talk of an authoritarian Chinese 
developmental model, competing with that of the richer (but slower-growing) Western 
democratic economies.  
Hence, there is a continued need to state the “business case” for democracy. This is 
perhaps especially true today, as authoritarian practices are replacing democratic governance in 
many large countries, from Turkey to Brazil to Poland, and where democratic principles are 
under pressure even in long-standing democracies such as India and the United States. In the 
following, I review existing evidence and point to often overlooked patterns in the data that 
indicate a clearer “business case” for democracy than what its detractors believe. I draw two 
important conclusions:  
First, I propose that – the mixed results in the large, statistical literature notwithstanding 
– democracy likely carries a stronger positive relationship with economic growth than often 
concluded. Existing studies underappreciate the relationship due to seemingly technical matters 
such as controlling for important mechanisms through which democracy enhances growth and 
omitting autocracies with poor growth records. Moreover, autocracies often report biased data 
                                                            
2 For an early meta-study, see Hristos Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ulubasoglu. “Democracy and Economic Growth: 
A Meta-Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 52(1 2008): 61-83. For a recent meta-study, comprising 2047 
regression models from 188 studies, see Marco Colagrossi, Domenico Rossignoli and Mario A. Maggioni. “Does 
Democracy cause growth? A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions),” European Journal of Political Economy 61(2020): 
101824. Notably, this latter study finds (stronger) evidence of a positive effect of democracy once considering only 
the more recent studies after December, 2005. 
3 Haakon Gjerløw, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig and Matthew C. Wilson. One road to riches? How state building 
and democratization affect economic development. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
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that exaggerate their performances. This pattern has received recent attention with the likely 
under-reporting of COVID19 deaths in autocracies from China to Russia to Iran, but pertains 
also to GDP statistics.  
Second, I highlight how democracy works as a safety-net for avoiding the worst possible 
economic outcomes. Autocracies make up a very heterogeneous group of countries,4 and this 
heterogeneity spills over also in their economic policies and performances. While some 
uncertainty surrounds the “average” effect, there is little reason to doubt that democracies have 
lower variance in their economic performances than autocracies, and are better at avoiding 
economic crises. Hence, democracy is a less risky proposition for citizens and investors alike.  
To substantiate the latter point, I present descriptive patterns and results from analyses 
conducted on extensive data material. Autocracies dominate among the worst economic 
performances (at various points in modern history after 1800) and experience more frequent 
short-term economic crises. Further, they experience far more variation in growth patterns, both 
across countries and within countries, from year-to-year. I follow up these results by discussing 
explanations for the higher variation in autocracies, focusing on increased power concentrations 
of leaders and the vast differences in institutional features. In particular, the absence of 
institutionalized parties increases growth volatility in autocracies. 
Why democracy is better for business than it first appears 
Plausible theoretical arguments point in different directions concerning the economic benefits of 
democracy relative to autocracy.5 The ability of autocrats to ignore demands from short-sighted, 
consumption-seeking electorates – and bulldoze over various interest groups – should increase 
savings (and thus investment) rates and allow for efficiency-enhancing economic reforms to be 
pushed through without delays.6 This should boost growth in autocracies. Conversely, 
democratic leaders being accountable to wider constituencies strengthens incentives to spend on 
productivity-enhancing public goods and services that benefit the many, such as primary and 
secondary education, and dis-incentivizes predatory behavior.7 Further, an open and inclusive 
                                                            
4 See, e.g., Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz How Dictatorships Work. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
5 For a review, see Carl Henrik Knutsen. “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Review of Arguments and 
Results,” International Area Studies Review 15(4 2012): 393-415. 
6 See, e.g., Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7(3 1993): 51-69. 
7 See, e.g., Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake. “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human 
Capital,” American Journal of Political Science 47(2 2003): 333–347.   
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environment for critical debate and free exchange of ideas increases the dissemination of new 
technologies into and within democracies. Hence, democracies observe faster technological 
change, a primary driver of long-term economic growth.8 
Early statistical studies mostly report a null relationship or that democracy is bad for 
growth, whereas more recent studies typically find either a positive or non-robust relationship.9 
Hence, the position that there is a “democracy advantage” in generating growth looks more 
plausible today than a few decades ago. Still, also several recent studies find a non-significant 
relationship. Notably, four measurement and research design characteristics seem to influence 
results; when accounting for them, there is stronger evidence of a positive relationship between 
democracy and growth: 
First, studies on various outcomes from corruption to property rights protection suggest 
that it takes considerable time – up to a decade – before benefits of democratization are 
realized.10 One study has shown that economic growth declines initially after democratization, 
before it increases, and then peaks and stabilizes after about three years.11 It takes time from a 
regime changes to the new leaders being able to legislate new economic policies. Then, these 
policies must be implemented, and firms, consumers, and workers need time to respond and 
adjust their investments, purchases, and labor supply. Hence, analyses measuring democracy and 
growth with a time lag of, say, 3-5 years, are more credible than analyses measuring them 
concurrently, and the estimated growth-benefit of democracy is typically larger in the former 
specifications.12 
Second, control variable selection matters for results. For example, Daron Acemoglu and 
co-authors discuss the importance of taking into account past dynamics in income, and report a 
strong, positive relationship between democracy and growth once doing so.13 I have previously 
discussed how many studies actually “over-control” by holding constant factors such as access to 
education that enhance growth, but which are also clearly affected by democracy.14 This practice 
                                                            
8 See, e.g., Carl Henrik Knutsen. The Economic Effects of Democracy and Dictatorship (University of Oslo, PhD Thesis, 
2011). 
9 See, e.g., Colagrossi et al.. Does Democracy cause growth? A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions). 
10 For a closer discussion of these studies, and potential explanations, see Knutsen. The Economic Effects of Democracy 
and Dictatorship. 
11 Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis. “Democratization and Growth,” Economic Journal 118(532 2008): 
1520-1551. 
12 Carl Henrik Knutsen. The Economic Effects of Democracy and Dictatorship (University of Oslo, PhD Thesis, 2011). 
13 Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A. Robinson. “Democracy does cause growth,” 
Journal of Political Economy 127(1 2019): 47-100. 
14 Knutsen, Democracy and Economic Growth: A Review of Arguments and Results. 
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of “blocking off” relevant indirect effects often leads researchers to under-estimate the growth 
benefits of democracy. A meta-study of 84 studies on democracy and growth substantiates this 
point, finding that the studies that control for several policy or outcome variables, including 
inflation, economic freedom, education, and political instability, are less likely to find a positive 
relationship.15 Controlling for such variables entails “blocking off” key indirect effects as 
theoretical arguments indicate that democracy should enhance growth through, for example, 
protecting property rights or improving access to education.  
Third, measurement of democracy may influence results. For instance, the dichotomous 
measure used in the most widely cited study on the topic (by Przeworski and colleagues) seems 
to systematically underestimate democracy’s effect on growth.16 To be considered democratic, 
this measure requires alternation in government after multi-party elections. Young democracies 
with a high-growth record are then sometimes erroneously coded as dictatorships since their 
popular governments have yet to lose elections. Further, some studies show that taking into 
account a country’s past experiences with democratic rule, in addition to the current level, 
strengthens the positive link with growth.17 Most other studies on do not use measures that 
capture the influence of regime history. 
Fourth, dictatorships more often fail to report or, alternatively, report less credible 
economic statistics than democracies. More specifically, missing GDP data is more common for 
autocracies, and especially low-performing autocracies such as North Korea under Kim Jong Il 
or Afghanistan under the Taliban.18 Even when data are reported, systematic errors may lead 
researchers to underestimate the effect of democracy on growth.  Politicized statistical agencies, 
and national and local leaders’ expectations (or demands) that bureaucrats create advantageous 
production statistics, were features of the Soviet Union’s planned economy. A more recent 
example of manipulated GDP numbers is China. Researchers have estimated that China’s GDP 
growth was 1.7 percentage points below official numbers from 2008-2016, possibly because 
“local governments are rewarded for meeting growth and investment targets, [and therefore] 
                                                            
15 Hristos Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ulubasoglu. Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis. 
16 Carl Henrik Knutsen and Tore Wig. “Government Turnover and the Effects of Regime Type: How Requiring 
Alternation in Power Biases against the Estimated Economic Benefits of Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 
48(7 2015): 882-914. 
17 John Gerring, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt and Carola Moreno. “Democracy and economic growth: A 
historical perspective,” World Politics 57(3 2005): 323-364. See also Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson, Vanessa 
A. Boese and Sandra Grahn. “Democratic Legacies: Using Democratic Stock to Assess Norms, Growth, and 
Regime Trajectories”. V-Dem Working Paper 100 (2020).  
18 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein. 2005. The Democracy Advantage: How 
Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2005, 33); Knutsen, The Economic Effects of 
Democracy and Dictatorship, 174-175. 
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have an incentive to skew local statistics”.19 The Soviet and Chinese examples are not exceptions. 
Using satellite nighttime light data as a yardstick, studies have estimated that autocracies 
systematically exaggerate their growth data, and the bias is sizeable: “annual GDP growth rates 
are estimated to be overstated by 0.5-1.5 percentage points in the statistics that dictatorships 
report to the World Bank”.20 
In sum, the observed relationship between democracy and growth depends on statistical 
modelling choices and data quality. A conservative conclusion is that the relationship between 
democracy and growth is not robust. While true, this conclusion should come with caveats: 
Many plausible statistical models, for example those not controlling for intermediate variables or 
measuring democracy a few years prior to the outcome, do find a positive (and rather sizeable) 
relationship. Indeed, this finding has become more prevalent in studies conducted over the last 
15 years,21 as sample sizes, data quality, and methodological sophistication have improved. These 
patterns indicate that a positive relationship may still be our “best guess”.  
Democracy as a safety-net: patterns in the data 
The discussion above notwithstanding, it is valuable to dig deeper into why the democracy-
growth relationship lacks robustness. One important explanation is that growth performances 
are very heterogeneous for regimes with similar levels of democracy, especially toward the 
autocratic end of the scale. Hence, analysis on the “average relationship” between democracy 
and growth may mask substantial heterogeneity. Put differently, some autocracies display very 
high GDP p.c. growth, at least for some time, whereas others preside over stagnant or even 
contracting economies. This observation has been made before,22 but I revisit it to assess how it 
holds up across time and probe its robustness. 
I start out by describing the distributions of growth rates, by regime type, for different 
periods across modern history. I utilize GDP p.c. data from the Maddison project and draw on 
Skaaning et al.’s Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy.23 I first calculate the annualized 
                                                            
19 Wei Chen, Xilu Chen, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Zheng Song. “A Forensic Examination of China's National Accounts,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1 2019): 77. 
20 Christopher S. Magee and John A. Doces. Reconsidering Regime Type and Growth: Lies, Dictatorships, and 
Statistics. International Studies Quarterly 59(2 2015): 223. 
21 Colagrossi et al.. Does Democracy cause growth? A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions). 
22 E.g., Dani Rodrik. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
23 Jutta Bolt and Jan L. van Zanden, J.L. “The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts,” 
Economic History Review 67(3 2014): 627–651. Svend-Erik Skaaning, John Gerring, Henrikas Bartusevičius. “A Lexical Index of 
Electoral Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 48(12 2015): 1491-1525. Regarding other data used in this paper, indices for 
Polyarchy, Party Institutionalization, Legislative Constraints, and Impartial Administration are from Michael Coppedge et al. “V-
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percentage growth rate in GDP p.c. across a decade (e.g., 2000-2009), and measure regime type 
at the decade’s beginning (e.g., in 2000). For this descriptive exercise, I dichotomize the 
mentioned democracy index so that countries with both competitive multi-party elections and 
suffrage for at least half of the adult population are coded as “democratic”. Countries without 
competitive multi-party elections or with less extensive suffrage are coded as “autocratic”.24 To 
check for how consistent patterns are across time, I split the 1800-2009 period into five intervals. 
Given the fewer countries with data, and especially the paucity of democracies according to this 
categorization, early on, I consider the entire 19th century as one-time interval. The second 
interval covers 1900-39, i.e., four decades, whereas the third time interval covers three decades 
(1940-69). The two final periods (1970-89; 1990-2009) cover two decades each. 
  The plots in Figure 1 show that certain patterns appear in most periods. First, the typical 
growth rates for democratic observations (red, solid lines) are higher than for autocracies (black, 
dashed lines). Second, variation is higher for the autocratic distributions, which incorporate 
various political systems with diverse institutional arrangements. The larger variation is especially 
notable if we consider the distributions’ “tails” – suggesting that more extreme (negative and 
positive) growth rates appear more frequently in autocratic contexts. 
 
                                                            
Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10” (2020a). See also Coppedget et al. “V-Dem v10. Codebook” (2020b) and 
Pemstein et al “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-
Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 2020.  Conflict data are from Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman Resort to 
War: 1816 - 2007. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). Natural resource data are from Michael K. Miller. “Democratic Pieces: 
Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815,” British Journal of Political Science 45(3 2015): 501-530. Detailed 
results and additional analysis are presented in an accompanying Online Appendix. 
24 Results are quite robust to using alternative operational rules for dividing up the sample into relatively democratic 
and relatively autocratic countries, for instance when using the categorical measure by Anna Lührman, Marcus 
Tannenberg and Staffan I. Lindberg. “Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative 
Study of Political Regimes,” Politics and Governance 6(1 2018): 60-77 or the dichotomous measure by Carles Boix, 
Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. “A Complete Dataset of Political Regimes, 1800-2007,” Comparative Political 
Studies 46(12 2013): 1523-54. 
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Figure 1: Economic growth rates for democracies (red, solid lines) and autocracies 
(black, dashed lines) in different time periods. 
Note: All plots are so-called: Kernel density plots of ten-year growth rates, with country-decades as units of 
observation. 
 
To be more specific, mean growth was considerably higher in democracies during all periods, 
except for 1900-1939, when several democratic economies were hit by World War I and 
struggled through the subsequent Great Depression. For instance, the mean GDP p.c. growth 
rate was 1.7 for democracies during the 19th century, compared to 0.8 for autocracies, and the 
corresponding numbers for 1970-89 were 2.0 and 1.0. Moreover, the variance in growth rates 
was also consistently higher for autocracies, again with the exception being 1900-39. The 
difference was particularly high during the 1990s and 2000s, with 5.5 in variance across 154 
democratic country-decades and 23.1 in variance across 145 autocratic country-decades. Only 7.1 
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percent of democratic observations achieved negative growth rates and 0.6 percent exceeded 
+10 percent. For autocracies, 28.3 percent of observations experienced negative growth and 5.5 
percent growth above +10 percent. When considering all “growth decades” from 1800-2009, the 
mean autocratic growth rate was 1.5 percent across 877 country-decades and the mean 
democratic one was 2.6 percent (364 country-decades). The respective variances were 9.4 and 
6.0.  
The higher variation among autocracies – especially the longer tails signifying more 
extreme observations – is also indicated by lists of “growth miracles” and “growth disasters”, to 
use Przeworski et al.’s terminology. These authors used data from 1950-1990 and concluded that 
both lists “are populated almost exclusively by dictatorships”.25 
 
Table 1: Growth miracles and disasters from 1990-2016. 
1990s  2000s  2010-2016 
Top ten, GDP p.c. growth rate 
Equatorial Guinea   17.3  Azerbaijan   17.4  Burma/Myanmar   10.4 
Singapore   9.8  Turkmenistan   14.9  Kyrgyzstan   10.2 
Ireland   8.3  Angola   14.5  Laos   8.9 
Kuwait   7.3  Equatorial Guinea   12.6  Ethiopia   7.9 
Qatar   7.1  Kazakhstan   12.0  Namibia   7.9 
Malta   6.7  Iraq   11.6  Mongolia   6.8 
Vietnam   6.5  Mongolia   10.6  Iraq   6.8 
Lebanon   6.3  Jordan   10.5  Uzbekistan   6.1 
South Korea   6.1  Zambia   9.7  Lithuania   6.1 
Luxembourg   6.1  Georgia   9.3  Indonesia   6.1 
Bottom ten, GDP p.c. growth rate 
Russia   -7.3 
 
Israel   -0.2  Republic of Congo   -2.7 
Iraq   -8.0 
 
Burkina Faso   -0.2  Sierra Leone   -3.2 
Moldova   -8.3 
 
Guinea-Bissau   -0.2  Venezuela   -3.4 
Ukraine   -8.4 
 
Central African Republic   -0.5  Equatorial Guinea   -4.6 
DR Congo   -9.5 
 
Luxembourg   -0.9  Lebanon   -4.8 
Afghanistan   -9.5 
 
Haiti   -1.6  Central Afr. Rep.   -5.4 
Kyrgyzstan   -11.2 
 
Burundi   -2.5  Barbados   -5.7 
Georgia   -11.5 
 
Barbados   -3.5  Syria   -7.5 
Azerbaijan   -12.0 
 
United Arab Emirates   -5.7  Yemen   -10.8 
Tajikistan   -12.9 
 
Zimbabwe   -6.2  Libya   -20.2 
Notes: Numbers indicate annualized growth rates as averages across periods. Regime category is measured the first 
year and indicated by color (green denotes democratic; orange denotes autocratic). Post-Soviet republics obtain the 
Soviet Union’s 1990-autocracy coding. 
Table 1 maps the worst and best performers per decade after 1990, when Przeworski et 
al’s investigation ended. The patterns conform with those of earlier time periods. Autocracies 
                                                            
25 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi. Democracy and development: 
Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178. 
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dominate the lists for top- and, especially, bottom performers. Autocracies – following the 
dichotomous categorization based on Skaaning et al.’s (2015) measure -- made up 6 of the 10 
top-performing countries in the (relatively slow-growing) 1990s, but 9 of 10 in the (fast-growing) 
2000s. From 2010-2016 (last year of the GDP data), autocracies made up 5 of 10 top performers. 
Concerning bottom performers, all 10 countries were autocracies in the 1990s and 7 of 10 
countries were autocracies in the period from 2010-2016. The 2000s is the exception, as only 5 
bottom achievers were autocracies -- this is, indeed, the lowest share in any decade with data. 
When looking closer at these lists, some noticeable patterns indicate why autocracies vary 
more in growth than democracies. Surely, the top-10 list for the 1990s include persistent 
development miracles such as Singapore and more recent ones such as Vietnam. Yet, it also 
includes economies with oil-fueled growth booms such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Equatorial Guinea 
(which is also on the bottom-10 list after 2010, a period with decreasing oil prices). Considering 
the worst-performers of the 1990s, this list is dominated by post-Soviet republics – though not 
the more democratic ones in the Baltics – that experienced a sharp decline in their registered 
growth rates with the collapse of Soviet command economy (and its inflated GDP statistics). 
Inevitably, several post-Soviet republics experienced “rebound growth” after the disastrous early 
1990s, and some figure among the top performers of the ensuing decade.  
More generally, and as Przeworski et al. also observed, being a top performer in a 
particular decade often follows a disastrous economic performance in years prior. The very high 
growth volatility of autocracies – which I elaborate on below – thus “mechanically” ensures that 
some autocracies experience short periods of rapid growth. This holds also for regimes that 
experience rebound growth after devastating conflicts, such as Angola or Iraq in the 2000s. 
Insofar as regime type affects the likelihood of large-scale conflict, it also contributes to explain 
why 1990s-DR Congo or Afghanistan, 2000s-Burundi, or Assad’s Syria, Gadhafi’s Libya and 
Yemen from 2010-2016 are on the lists of growth disasters. Finally, the growth disasters include 
autocratic regimes with a well-documented track-record of economic mismanagement such as 
2000s-Zimbabwe under Mugabe or Venezuela under Chavez and then Maduro, from 2010-2016.  
However, direct comparisons of growth rates across democracies and autocracies must be taken 
with a grain of salt; regimes differ systematically in other relevant regards. For example, initially 
poor countries are more often autocratic, and poor countries have higher potential for fast 
(catch-up) growth and inherently higher variation in growth performance. Hence, scholars 
working on democracy and growth typically run regression analysis, controlling for relevant 
confounders.  
 12 
In Figure 2, I show results from some such regressions controlling for initial income 
level, time trends, and country-specific factors that may affect both regime type and growth. I do 
not include any additional controls, following the discussion above on the tendency of scholars 
to “over-control” for factors that are important intermediate variables such as education policies 
or investment rates. Since I am no longer discussing simple descriptive contrasts, and want to 
include as much information as possible, I employ V-Dem’s continuous Polyarchy index of 
electoral democracy.26 These analyses include data from more than 15,000 observations, 
spanning 163 countries and 223 years. 
The first analyses, shown in the upper panel of Figure 2, consider the standard, “average” 
relationship between democracy and GDP p.c. growth. To account for the discussed time-lag in 
the effect, I measure growth five years after Polyarchy. One analysis models the time trends in 
growth with year-specific effects, whereas the other analysis allows for comparisons across time 
by rather including a fairly flexible (cubic) time trend. Both analysis indicate a positive 
relationship between democracy and growth, but the uncertainty is quite large and the 
significance of the relationship hinges on the particular model chosen. When I control for year-
specific effects on growth, the relationship is statistically insignificant at conventional levels, but 
the more lenient control for time-trends in growth yields a substantially larger and statistically 
significant coefficient. To illustrate, going from the Polyarchy score of 2019-Venezuela (0.23) to 
that of 2019-Uruguay (0.86) increases the predicted growth rate in the latter statistical model by 
almost one percentage point, which is substantial: If two initially equal economies growth at 
different speeds, with the faster-growing having a one percent higher annual growth rate in GDP 
per capita, the faster-growing one will end up as twice as rich as the slower-growing one after 
about 70 years. What is more, this estimated difference may even be attenuated, since it does not 
account for the discussed over-reporting of GDP numbers in more autocratic regimes. 
 
                                                            
26 Jan Teorell, Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindbergand Svend-Erik Skaaning. ”Measuring Polyarchy across the 
Globe, 1900–2017.” Studies in Comparative International Development 54(1 2019): 71-95. 
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Figure 2: Results from analyses of relationships between democracy and economic 
growth (top), probability of experiencing economic crisis (middle), or growth volatility 
(bottom). 
Notes: Coefficient plots, with 95% confidence intervals, for V-Dem’s Polyarchy index, in OLS regressions with 
errors clustered by country. Dependent variables (DV) and controls vary as indicated by headings and legends, but 
all specifications control for initial income level (Ln GDP p.c.). Country-FE: Country-fixed effects. Year-FE: Year-
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The “average” relationship is thus sensitive to statistical modelling choices. In contrast, 
measures focusing on particular adverse economic outcomes or variability in economic 
performance yield more robust results. One illustration is the relationship between democracy 
and the probability of observing a subsequent economic crisis. Figure 2 (middle panel) presents 
results from two regressions where crisis is variously defined as experiencing negative growth 
rate in a year or growth below minus 5 percentage points. Overall, 28.6 percent of the 15,516 
observations included in the analysis experience negative growth, whereas 8.8 percent experience 
growth below minus 5 percentage points. The predicted probabilities of experiencing such 
events are reduced by, respectively, 8.5 and 4.8 percentage points when going from Venezuela’s 
2019 Polyarchy level (0.23) to Uruguay’s (0.86). These (statistically significant) results hold up 
even when controlling for various types of ongoing inter- and intra-state armed conflicts and fuel 
and mineral income as share of GDP, or when using alternative definitions of “crisis” and 
alternative GDP data.27 
Democracy also reduces overall variability in economic growth. The analyses in Figure 
2’s bottom panel have a measure of overall variation -- the so-called “standard deviation” -- in 
GDP p.c. growth over the subsequent decade as the outcome. The rightmost estimate indicates 
that the variation is much higher in more autocratic regimes when allowing for comparisons 
across countries. The leftmost estimate shows that the variation is systematically higher for these 
regimes also when we control for country-specific factors, and thereby only consider changes 
within countries as they become more or less democratic over time. These results corroborate 
earlier findings, which have typically relied on far shorter time series.28 Hence, countries that 
experience democratization can also expect less growth volatility in the future.  
These results might reflect that many autocracies are fuel and mineral producers or that 
poor autocracies more often experience armed conflicts. Having an economy centered on 
production of particular fuels or minerals makes the economy sensitive to price fluctuations, 
increasing growth volatility. Armed conflicts are associated with destruction of capital stocks and 
reduced output, whereas post-conflict periods often observe high rebound growth. Hence, I re-
ran the specifications in Figure 2, but controlling for fuel and mineral income as share of GDP 
and dummies registering inter- and intra-state conflicts. I actually find that controlling for 
ongoing armed conflicts and resource dependence barely alters the estimated difference in 
growth variability between regimes, which remains substantial in size and highly significant. One 
                                                            
27 Carl Henrik Knutsen. “Autocracy and variation in economic development outcomes,” in G Crawford and A-G 
Abdulai. [Eds.] Handbook on Democracy and Development. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2020). 
28 But, see Knutsen, “Autocracy and variation in economic development outcomes”. 
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might argue that adding these controls is inappropriate, as the tendency to operate a non-
diversified, resource-reliant economy or experience armed conflict are partly consequences of 
autocratic rule. This question notwithstanding, the conclusion is that more autocratic regimes 
have higher growth variability. 
What explains the high growth variability in autocracies, and why 
growth variability matters 
There are different plausible explanations for the large variation in growth performances among 
dictatorships, both when measured across countries but also within countries, over time. I will 
here briefly mention some such explanations centering on i) the individual autocrat, and ii) the 
different institutions that appear in the heterogeneous set of regimes that are grouped together 
due to their lack of democracy. 
First, power is more concentrated with the leadership – and often with one particular 
leader -- in autocracies than democracies. Thus, the preferences and cognitive abilities of the top 
leader also matters more for which policies are selected, with downstream consequences for 
economic performance. Given the large variance in cognitive abilities and preferences of 
different individuals, this should contribute to the large growth variance in autocracies, also 
within regimes when one leader replaces another. For example, dictators who care primarily 
about their own private consumption likely pursue different redistributive and investment 
policies than autocrats primarily concerned with maximizing regime survival or their own control 
over society.29 
The notion that the particular individual filling the role of autocrat is important for 
economic performance is backed up by stringent evidence. Jones and Olken consider natural 
deaths of leaders and study the subsequent impact on growth rates.30 They find that leader 
deaths in autocracies are accompanied by a significant change in growth, and that the change is 
larger in autocracies with fewer constraints on executive power. In contrast, leader deaths do not 
systematically alter the growth rates of democracies.  
In addition to personal characteristics of leaders varying across autocracies, there is vast 
variation in political institutions. How institutions are structured in autocracies shape which 
leaders are selected. Institutions also shape leaders’ incentives to take a long-time horizon or be 
                                                            
29 Ronald Wintrobe. The Political Economy of Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
30 Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World 
War II,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3 2005): 835-864. 
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myopic or to consider broad swaths of the population versus only the utility of a selected few 
when formulating economic policies. Such differences, ultimately, shape economic performance. 
Below, we consider three institutional features that could shape the economic performances of 
autocracies: 
First, a literature on “developmental states” details how strong states with capable and 
effective bureaucracies -- especially in authoritarian contexts – promoted industrial- and other 
economic policies that, in turn, spurred economic development, especially in many Asian 
countries after WWII.31 In contrast, studies on African countries have cast the “neo-patrimonial” 
African state, with its clientelistic ties and lack of meritocratic recruitment to the bureaucracy, as 
a primary culprit behind these countries’ weak economic development records. Indeed, there are 
reasons to believe that the mix of low state capacity and autocracy is particularly toxic for 
growth, and, empirically, autocracy has a substantially larger negative effect on growth in Africa 
than elsewhere.32 Possibly, the presence or absence of high-capacity state institutions might also 
contribute to explaining why some autocracies pursue economic policies that produce more or 
less volatile growth. The continuity and expectations-stabilizing role provided by a rule-following 
and competent bureaucracy may mitigate chances of sudden (negative) shifts in economic 
performance, and these bureaucratic features’ role in limiting the discretionary powers of 
autocrats could contribute to the same outcome. 
Second, other institutions that constrain the autocrat and standardize decision-making 
processes could also influence both average growth and growth volatility in autocracies. One 
study has found that legislatures that effectively constrain the autocrat enhance economic 
growth, and another study has presented evidence that more “institutionalized” autocracies -- 
especially those having both regime parties and legislatures -- have higher growth rates.33 There is 
no general evidence on how autocratic legislatures affect growth volatility, but a recent study has 
found that stronger horizontal constraints on leaders imposed by legislatures reduce the impact 
of leadership turnover on changes to growth.34 
                                                            
31 E.g., Alice Amsden. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
32 Carl Henrik Knutsen. “Democracy, State Capacity and Economic Growth,” World Development 43 (2013): 1-18. 
33 Joseph Wright. “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and 
Investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52(2 2008): 322-343; Jennifer Gandhi. “Dictatorial Institutions 
and their Impact on Economic Growth,” European Journal of Sociology 49(3 2008): 3-30. 
34 Gary W. Cox and Barry R. Weingast. “Executive Constraint, Political Stability, and Economic Growth,” 
Comparative Political Studies 51(3 2018): 279-303. 
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Third, in previous work several colleagues and I have found clear evidence that 
institutionalized parties (overall, but also in autocracies, specifically) increase average growth.35 
Institutionalized parties prolong the time horizons of policy makers and broaden the 
constituencies to which leaders respond. The expanded time horizons and constituencies coming 
from more institutionalized parties should not only be conducive to higher average growth, but 
also make for more stable policies that are less prone to changes and reversals set in motion by 
any single actor. Hence, institutionalized parties – like democracy – should even reduce growth 
volatility. Indeed, studying both democracies and autocracies together, my colleagues and I have 
found that more institutionalized parties mitigate reduce growth volatility.36 Below, I will 
investigate whether this pattern holds up in a subsample of autocratic regimes. 
I conducted two types of tests to assess the different, plausible hypotheses on growth 
volatility in autocracies. First, I controlled for impartial and rule-following behavior by 
bureaucrats, party institutionalization, or legislative constraints on the executive, using indices or 
indicators from V-Dem, in the regressions from above on growth variability. Next, I split the 
sample into autocracies and democracies, using the Skaaning et al. measure, before analyzing 
how the different institutional measures correlated with growth volatility for each sub-sample.  
When including impartial administration, legislative constraints, or party institutionalization in 
the regression models on growth volatility, only the inclusion of the latter substantially alters the 
relationship between Polyarchy and growth volatility. More specifically, Polyarchy is reduced to 
about 2/3 of its original size after controlling for party institutionalization. However, also 
Polyarchy remains highly statistically significant. Hence, the higher variance in autocratic growth 
rates seems to be partly due to political parties often being less institutionalized in autocracies, 
but even when accounting for such differences autocracies display substantially higher variation. 
Further, when separating democracies and autocracies, there is a clear relationship 
between party institutionalization and growth variability in autocracies. These results are reported 
in Figure 3. Going from the year-2010 value of Saudi Arabia (0.03) to China (0.74) on V-Dem’s 
Party Institutionalization index reduces the so-called standard deviation in growth over the next 
decade by almost 3; autocracies with more institutionalized parties have considerably less over-
time variation in their growth performances. Somewhat surprisingly, impartial administration and 
legislative constraints do not display a systematic relationship with growth volatility in 
                                                            
35 Fernando Bizzarro, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Svend-Erik Skaaning, 
Michael Coppedge and Staffan I. Lindberg. “Party Strength and Economic Growth,” World Politics 70(2 2018): 
275-320. 
36 Bizzarro et al. “Party Strength and Economic Growth”. 
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autocracies, as displayed in Figure 3, but further analysis show that they do seem to mitigate 
growth variability in democracies. 
 
Figure 3: Results from analyses of relationships between different institutional features 
and standard deviation in growth over the next decade, for a sub-sample of autocracies. 
Notes: Coefficient plots, with 95% confidence intervals, for various institutional measures from V-Dem, in a sub-
sample of autocracies. The left specification includes V-Dem’s Legislative Constraints Index as regressor, the middle 
specification includes the Party Institutionalization Index, and the right specification includes an indicator on rule-
following and impartial public administration. All three specifications are OLS regressions with errors clustered by 
country. Dependent variable is standard deviation in GDP p.c. growth over the subsequent decade and controls 
include initial income level (Ln GDP p.c.), country-fixed effects, and year-fixed effects.  
 
The higher variability in economic performance among autocracies (and especially 
regimes with weak or no parties) is not only of academic interest, but likely influences the actions 
and well-being of investors, entrepreneurs, and citizens trying to maneuver in these economies. 
High growth volatility, presumably following from high variability in the economic policies 
pursued by autocrats, may even have independent effects on future performance. A key part of 
the behavior of economic actors – from entrepreneurs to capital owners to prospective workers 
considering which education to pursue – is forming predictions about the future economic 
environment. 
Assuming that many such economic actors are risk averse, high variability could deter 
different types of investments and other economic transactions with high expected future gains. 
Stability and predictability may be especially important for innovation-related activities that 
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(which allow for specialization and potentially have high returns to investment, but also entail 
higher risk). Hence, the desire to mitigate variability in policy and performance, and ensuring a 
stable, less risky environment, is a key part of the business case for democracy. For risk-averse 
workers and consumers, high growth volatility related to violent business cycles enhances the 
chances of outcomes that produce low utility, notably including increased chances of 
unemployment, which may be especially bad in autocratic systems where large groups of workers 
are often not covered by unemployment insurance.  
Growth volatility thus matters for producers and consumers alike. While scholars 
studying democracy and growth have studied average growth over long periods of time, macro-
economists from Keynes onwards have focused intensively on business cycles and how to 
mitigate them with fiscal and monetary policies. Especially after WWII, also many politicians 
have been concerned with constructing economic policies to counter business cycles, further 
signifying their importance. The results presented above suggest that one cure for violent 
business cycles is not merely a particular policy, but rather democratic features of the regime 
that, in turn, likely affect several policies with downstream implications for growth volatility. 
Conclusion 
I have laid out the business case for democracy, focusing on the relationship with economic 
growth. Existing studies have been more ambiguous about the benevolent effects of democracy 
on growth compared to other development outcomes such as infant mortality rates or literacy. 
Yet, I have discussed factors that make several previous studies underestimate the relationship 
between democracy and growth. For instance, autocracies seem to systematically over-report 
GDP numbers and many existing studies have controlled for relevant indirect effects such as 
access to education. Nonetheless, the average relationship between democracy and growth – 
while fairly strong and plausible – is not entirely robust, and hinges on specification choices.  
In contrast, relationships between democracy and measures of variation in economic 
performance are robust. As such, democratic rule may present businesses and citizens alike with 
an important economic safety-net. Democracy mitigates the possibility for countries to 
experience truly tragic economic outcomes. The kind of growth disasters associated with Mao’s 
Great Leap Forward in China or Mobutu Sese Seko’s kleptocratic rule in Zaïre simply do not 
occur in democratic systems, presumably because voters will kick out leaders pursuing such 
economic policies. Further, democracies are less likely than autocracies to observe violent 
business cycles and high growth volatility. Avoiding very poor outcomes and economic 
instability is of great value to investors, workers and consumers living in democracies. 
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